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NORTON V. UTE INDIAN TRIBE: SEEKING CONCRETE 
DELINEATIONS IN THE TRIBAL EXHAUSTION DOCTRINE 
While American Indian tribes are ever-seeking to promote their own 
self-governance and right to territorial management within reservation 
borders, tribal judicial systems have been traditionally limited in their abil-
ity to assert civil jurisdiction over nonmembers within reservations. The 
Ute Tribe’s desire for control within its reservation led to the Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals’ decision in Norton v. Ute Indian Tribe,1 in which the 
court found that nonmember defendants must exhaust Ute tribal remedies 
with respect to a tribal trespass claim, but not for other tribal tort claims 
asserted in the aftermath of the death of a tribal member, Todd Murray.2 
Murray died following a police pursuit led by Utah State Trooper Dave 
Swenson on April 1, 2007.3 Following Murray’s death, which occurred 
within the Ute Reservation, Ute tribal law enforcement officers were pre-
vented from accessing the scene.4 In response, Murray’s parents, his es-
tate, and the Ute Tribe sued Swenson and other officers involved for 
wrongful trespass, false arrest, spoliation of evidence, conspiracy, and 
other torts.5 The officers then filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim in federal 
district court against the Ute Tribe and a number of its branches, including 
the Ute Tribal Court.6 The United States District Court for the District of 
Utah then enjoined the Ute Tribal Court action, holding that the tribal court 
lacked civil jurisdiction over the officers.7 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals found that the district court had erred in enjoining the 
suit before the officers had exhausted tribal court remedies with respect to 
the Tribe’s trespass claim.   
On the day of his death, Murray was a passenger in a vehicle that officer 
Swenson attempted to stop for speeding near the Ute Reservation.8 Instead 
of stopping, the driver turned into the Reservation, initiating a thirty-mi-
nute chase that ended when the driver and Murray exited the vehicle and 
ran.9 Although the driver was quickly apprehended, Murray escaped on 
foot.10 Upon returning to his car with the apprehended driver, Swenson 
was joined by a number of additional law enforcement officials, none of 
whom were cross-deputized to assert law enforcement authority on the Ute 
  
 1. Norton v. Ute Indian Tribe, No. 15-4170 (10th Cir. July 11, 2017). 
 2. Id. at 2. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. at 5.  
 5. Id. at 2. 
 6. Id.  
 7. Id.  
 8. Id. at 4.  
 9. Id.  
 10. Id.  
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Reservation.11 Swenson and the additional officers eventually located 
Murray and ordered him to the ground, but Murray continued to resist cap-
ture.12 One of the additional officers, Vance Norton, fired two shots toward 
Murray, who was thereafter declared dead from a gunshot wound.13 
Shortly after Murray’s death, a certified Ute tribal officer and tribal mem-
ber arrived on the scene, but Swenson and the additional officers forbade 
him from accessing the scene.14 Because these events involved a tribal 
member’s death within the Reservation, the Ute Tribal Court asserted civil 
jurisdiction over the officers with respect to claims arising from the inci-
dent.  
The tribal exhaustion doctrine is judicially created and rooted in com-
ity.15 The rule seeks to forward federal policies of promoting tribal sover-
eignty, including, “(1) furthering the congressional policy of supporting 
tribal self-government; (2) promoting the orderly administration of justice 
by allowing a full record to be developed by the tribal court; and (3) ob-
taining the benefit of tribal expertise if further review becomes neces-
sary.”16 The doctrine requires that federal courts defer to tribal courts in 
instances of concurrent jurisdiction in civil disputes between Indians and 
non-Indians for which tribal courts assert jurisdiction. In these instances, 
before a federal district court may address whether an Indian tribal court 
properly asserts jurisdiction, a party must first exhaust tribal court reme-
dies.17 Generally, this means that parties to certain cases involving Indians 
or Indian land must exhaust tribal remedies prior to seeking relief in fed-
eral court.18 In requiring tribal exhaustion, federal courts need not affirm-
atively determine that civil jurisdiction lies with the tribe, but rather that 
the tribe has a colorable claim to jurisdiction.19 Tribal jurisdiction may 
then be challenged in federal court following tribal exhaustion.  
The Tenth Circuit follows Montana20 jurisprudence when addressing 
tribal assertions of civil jurisdiction. Under Montana, the court begins 
from the presumption that tribal civil jurisdiction only extends to tribal 
members and cannot be asserted over non-members.21 However, in Mon-
tana, the U.S. Supreme Court set forth two exceptions allowing tribal civil 
jurisdiction over non-members.22 First, a tribe may assert civil jurisdiction 
  
 11. Id.  
 12. Id.  
 13. Id.  
 14. Id. at 5. 
 15. Id. at 7.  
 16. Id. at 6–7 (quoting Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Farley, 115 F.3d, 1498, 1507 (10th Cir. 1997)). 
 17. Id. at 10–11 (quoting Attorney’s Process & Investigation Servs., Inc. v. Sac & Fox Tribe of 
Miss. In Iowa, 609 F.3d 927, 937 (8th Cir. 2010)).  
 18. Id. at 3.  
 19. Id. at 8 (quoting Thlopthlocco Tribal Town v. Stidham, 762 F.3d 1226, 1238 (10th Cir. 
2014)).  
 20. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981). 
 21. Norton, No. 15-4170 at 8 (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 566 (1981)). 
 22. Id. at 8 (citing Montana, 450 U.S. at 566 (1981)). 
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in instances in which the tribe is regulating consensual activities between 
nonmembers and the tribe or its members.23 Second, a tribe may assert 
civil jurisdiction when the conduct of non-Indians “threatens or has some 
direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health 
or welfare of the tribe.”24  
Both the officers and district court relied upon Hicks to support a finding 
against tribal jurisdiction over of the officers. The Tenth Circuit, however, 
disagreed. In Hicks, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a tribal court lacked 
jurisdiction over nonmember law enforcement officers that allegedly con-
ducted an illegal search and seizure of a tribal member’s home on reserva-
tion land.25 The Court reasoned, “The State’s interest in pursuing off-res-
ervation violations of its laws outweighed the tribe’s sovereign right to 
make their own laws and be governed by them.”26 The Tenth Circuit dis-
tinguished Norton from Hicks, however, by pointing out that Murray was 
not suspected of committing any off-reservation crime.27 Although Murray 
was in the car fleeing the police, he was merely a passenger.28 Therefore, 
Hicks was unable to shield the officers from tribal jurisdiction, as Murray’s 
death did not implicate any state interest in pursuing off-reservation vio-
lations. The court then moved to a Montana analysis to determine whether 
the tribal court could colorably assert civil jurisdiction over the officers. 
The court found that the Tribe’s trespass claim did fit within Montana’s 
second exception, as the particular allegations of the claim potentially 
qualified as a critical undermining of the Tribe’s ability to manage its ter-
ritory and to engage in self-government.29 With respect to all other claims 
including false arrest, spoliation of evidence, and conspiracy, the court 
found no plausible tribal jurisdiction, as they did not meet either of the 
Montana exceptions.  
In finding that the district court erred in excusing the officers from ex-
haustion of tribal remedies regarding the Tribe’s trespass claim, the Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals clearly seems to have come to the proper conclu-
sion. Notwithstanding the physical threats to tribal property posed by tres-
passers, the foundation tribe’s political sovereignty is endangered when it 
is unable to enforce its right to exclude from tribal territory. Indeed, the 
U.S. Supreme Court once noted that a “hallmark of Indian sovereignty is 
the power to exclude non-Indians from Indian lands.”30 Surely, then, it 
  
 23. Id. (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 566). 
 24. Id. at 8–9 (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 566). 
 25. Id. at 17 (citing Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 361 (2001)). 
 26. Id. at 17 (quoting Nevada, 533 U.S. at 361) .  
 27. Id.   
 28. Id.   
 29. Id. at 13.  
 30. Merrion v, Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 141 (1981).  
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seems that an impingement of a hallmark of tribal sovereignty must con-
stitute a threat to tribal political and physical integrity and therefore require 
tribal exhaustion under Montana’s second exception.  
Beyond requiring the officers to exhaust tribal remedies for the Tribe’s 
trespass claim, the court’s holdings that foreclose jurisdiction for the 
Tribe’s additional claims raise a number of considerations. The court 
found that the Tribe’s additional claims including false arrest, spoliation 
of evidence, and conspiracy did not implicate the Tribe’s core sovereign 
interests at a level sufficient to require tribal exhaustion under the second 
Montana exception.31 Supporting its conclusion, the court cited a Ninth 
Circuit precedent which notes that any tort committed on or against Indi-
ans on Indian land can threaten a tribe’s political integrity, economic se-
curity, or the health and welfare of the tribe and, therefore, tribal claims 
must rise above a “generalized threat” before requiring tribal exhaustion 
under the second Montana exception.32 The court found that the additional 
claims failed to meet this threshold and did not require exhaustion. Spe-
cifically, the court found the facts analogous to Strate,33 in which the U.S. 
Supreme Court found a lack of tribal civil jurisdiction where the personal 
injury claims concerned only an individual and not the Tribe as a whole. 
However, the similarities between Norton and Strate appear debatable. 
Unlike the mere personal injury claim asserted in Strate, Norton involved 
nonmember obstruction of tribal law enforcement officers’ access to at 
tribal member’s death. The court’s holdings are particularly concerning 
considering that the officers were not cross-deputized to exercise law en-
forcement authority within the Reservation. It seems entirely plausible that 
the forceful and unlawful assertion of law enforcement authority leading 
to claims of false arrest, spoliation of evidence, and conspiracy are threats 
to the Ute Tribe’s political integrity that extend well beyond “generalized 
threats” in that they clearly undermine the Tribe’s ability to enforce its 
laws and control its territory. These facts, in the context of the Tribe’s ad-
ditional claims, appear to be more-than-sufficient to meet the second Mon-
tana exception, thereby requiring tribal exhaustion.  
The Norton decision first highlights that the Tenth Circuit views the 
right to exclude as fundamental to notions of tribal sovereignty and that 
future tribal trespass claims are likely to be subject to tribal civil jurisdic-
tion. Although the court refused to affirmatively state that the tribal court 
possessed jurisdiction over the trespass claim, the opinion provided strong 
language in support of tribal trespass claims fitting within the second Mon-
tana exception. Second, the Norton decision highlights the inherent ten-
sions within the tribal exhaustion doctrine and the difficulties associated 
with applying it. The policy considerations behind the tribal exhaustion 
doctrine imply a trust in tribal courts and a support for tribal sovereignty. 
  
 31. Norton, No. 15-4170 at 14.  
 32. Id. at 15, (quoting Philip Morris USA Inc. v. King Mountain Tobacco Co., 569 F.3d 932, 
943 (9th Cir. 2009)).  
 33. Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997).  
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However, the starting point of a Montana analysis is a presumption against 
jurisdiction over nonmember activity on tribal land, which undermines the 
ability of tribes to adequately govern within reservation borders. Further, 
the evolution of Montana jurisprudence has led to difficulties in applica-
tion across civil claims and fact patterns. It has led to blanket generaliza-
tions regarding the nature of civil claims, which may inhibit a federal 
court’s ability to protect seemingly rightful claims of tribal jurisdiction. 
By forcing arbitrary comparisons such as the Ute Tribe’s claims of false 
arrest, spoliation of evidence, and conspiracy to the personal injury facts 
of Strate, the Montana progeny of cases may, at times, lack the nuance 
necessary to adequately protect the integrity of tribal courts.  
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